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Regulatory Processes & Innovation Cycles in Times of 
Digitalization – a Contradiction? 
Peter Konrad 
Digitalization - without a doubt - is the main driver of innovation nowadays. This 
phenomenon takes place in almost every business, even within the medical device 
industry digital development is an important driving force. Digitalization allows a 
broad range of people to create their own mobile applications, as demonstrated by 
the enormous number of digital products available for mobile devices. While the 
simplified creation of digital products accelerates innovation in the medical device 
industry, regulatory processes remain the same yet seem to be necessary to provide 
a safe market entry. This work examines the influence of digital innovation on med-
ical devices and compares the regulatory processes in the US and Germany. There-
fore, a theoretical background of innovation and regulation theory is given. Subse-
quently, the regulatory systems of medical devices in the US and Germany are an-
alyzed regarding their fit for mobile applications. After describing problems arising 
due to long and inappropriate regulation systems, recommendations are given by a 
fictive regulatory system on how regulatory processes can be adjusted to accommo-
date mobile medical applications.  
Contents 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 164 
2 Innovation and regulation – a theoretical background ......................................... 164 
2.1 Theory of regulation and the principal-agent phenomenon ....................... 164 
2.2 Theory of innovation and the innovation process ...................................... 166 
2.3 The mutual impact of regulation and innovation ....................................... 168 
3 Regulatory processes as a hurdle for innovation? Data from the U.S. & GER ... 169 
3.1 The ‘mobile medical device’ – an example of innovation......................... 169 
3.2 Regulatory processes and innovation cycles in the US ............................. 169 
3.3 Regulatory processes and innovation cycles in Germany ......................... 172 
4 Possibilities for a harmonious interaction between regulation and innovation  ........ 
in healthcare ......................................................................................................... 174 
5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 175 
References ................................................................................................................... 177 
Published in: Schmid A. and Singh S. (2017), Crossing Borders - Innovation in the U.S. Health Care System, 
Schriften zur Gesundheitsökonomie, Vol. 84, Bayreuth: P.C.O.-Verlag.
Peter Konrad 
164 
1 Introduction 
Innovative developments within healthcare industry are often regarded as both a boon 
and bane at the same time. On one hand, making progress in medical devices offers huge 
potential: Processes may be simplified and optimized, providers better connected, and 
patient care improved. On the other hand, technological progress is blamed as a main 
driver for the continuous increase in healthcare costs (Sorenson et al., 2013). A substan-
tial role within innovation in healthcare is played by digitalization. The range of benefits 
of digitalization for the healthcare industry and health systems can still hardly be imag-
ined, though it is evident that digital products have had a huge impact (Malvey and 
Slovensky, 2014, p. 1). This rapid change to digitalization leads to several challenges: 
The subordinate problem deals with a still missing coherent terminology for digital, in-
novative products in healthcare (Albrecht and Jan, 2016, pp. 48–52). Of greater im-
portance is the creation of an appropriate regulatory system, which allows fast access to 
the market but still considers and eliminates potential threats (Kramer et al., 2012, 
p. 853). Due to health systems often being strictly regulated, beneficial circumstances 
for creating innovative products are scarce. Nevertheless, the number of digital products 
seems to grow without any limits while the political and regulatory frameworks around 
the globe struggle to keep pace (Bierbaum and Bierbaum, 2017, pp. 255–256; Boulos et 
al., 2014, p. 1; Roh and Kim, 2017). There is no doubt that regulation of medical devices 
is a mandatory part within every health system to secure patients’ health. Regulatory 
processes must fit adequately to the fast cycles of innovation and follow the rapid 
changes initiated by digitalization as well as the confusing number of digital products 
which claim to be part of the healthcare system. 
This work examines the problems within the medical device industry due to rigid and 
long regulatory processes in addition to the dynamic innovation cycles within the indus-
try. Because the meaning of digitalization for innovation in healthcare is still to be de-
termined this work will just focus on digital products within the medical device industry. 
A theoretical framework about regulation and innovation forms the basis for this topic. 
Afterwards, the application of regulatory processes on digital medical devices is inves-
tigated. Corresponding to the topic of the book, the focus is on these processes in the US 
and Germany. An evaluation of the suitability of the current situation and potential sug-
gestions for improvement closes this essay. 
2 Innovation and regulation – a theoretical background  
2.1 Theory of regulation and the principal-agent phenomenon 
The act of regulating market entry and distribution of medical devices within a health 
system has the intention of protecting people from undesirable effects on their health 
status (Cheng, 2003, pp. 3–8). This is based on a very fundamental understanding of 
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regulation: The interaction of normative objects and private interests demands govern-
mental action, which is represented through politics (Baron, 2007, p. 1,349). Regulation 
is commonly separated into economic regulation, social regulation and administrative 
regulation. While economic regulation is used for improving the performance of mar-
kets (e.g. through restrictions, standards, market entry conditions, etc.), social regulation 
relates to the protection of public health and well-being. Finally, administrative regula-
tion determines governmental actions in private and public sectors, e.g. taxes and 
healthcare administration (OECD, n.a.).   
Within markets, those regulatory interventions are required because of asymmetric in-
formation, a main part within the principal-agent theory. This phenomenon occurs when 
there are parties contracting with each other which are suffering an unequal level of 
information and individual action cannot be observed. As a consequence, this leads to 
moral hazard, which prohibits “first best” solutions (Holmstrom, 1979, p. 74). In the 
case of asymmetric information, regulation serves as mediator to create equal conditions 
between the principal and agent and to eliminate economically inefficient behavior 
(Baron, 2007, p. 1,349). Regarding regulation of medical devices, asymmetric infor-
mation can be observed in different scenarios: the manufacturer of a medical device 
(both physical and digital) has a strong advantage in information compared to custom-
ers; customers may be patients acquiring the product directly from the manufacturer or 
distributor and uses it for himself; or the customer is represented by a care provider, who 
acquires the medical device for commercial use and applies the medical device for pa-
tient treatment. The user in the last two cases is unable to assess the benefit of a medical 
device in advance, as is common in health economics (Zweifel and Manning, 2000, 
pp. 412–413). Furthermore, the manufacturer has an incentive to maximize his profit. A 
corresponding minimization of the costs to achieve greater profits in this situation could 
lead to a reduction of efforts to protect the interests of consumers. This legitimatizes  
governmental regulation to reduce economic costs and guarantee patient safety (Cheng, 
2003, pp. 7–8). Regarding medical devices affecting peoples’ health, the role of govern-
mental regulation is mainly to introduce and adopt a minimum standard of quality.  
There are several theoretical mechanisms through which asymmetric information can be 
solved by governmental regulation (Baron, 2007). In a concrete setting with a regulatory 
framework, the manufacturer of the medical device would have to pass a predefined and 
comparable standard, which allows the users to trust the product is at least a certain level 
of quality. Attention should be paid to changing circumstances, though. Regulatory pro-
cesses may be adequate for a certain range or type of products, but changes and drifts 
over time may influence the industry and demand an adoption of new regulatory frame-
work.    
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2.2 Theory of innovation and the innovation process  
The term “innovation” is widespread and used in several contexts with different mean-
ings (Baregheh et al., 2009). For a better understanding, there should be a common def-
inition of innovation: following the Sociologist Everett M. Rogers and his pioneering 
book “Diffusion of Innovations” innovation should be understood as something that dis-
tinguishes itself through a certain novel characteristic (Rogers, 2003, p. 12). This can be 
expressed through new processes, products, or changes in organization. The aim inno-
vation strives for - from a company’s point of view - is either to reduce unit costs and/or 
enlarge demand within the market (Sengupta, 2014, p. 1). Therefore, innovation is also 
seen as a possible way to create competitive advantage (Porter, 1990, p. 74).  
Innovation is often separated into different subtypes. We will just focus on few which 
are relevant to the medical device industry and digitalization:  
- One subtype is technology-based innovation. This term sums up all product in-
novation, process innovation, investments of the industry in research and devel-
opment, and the transmission of technology (Sengupta, 2014, p. 1).  
- Another separation into subtypes involves endogenous and exogenous innova-
tion. Endogenous innovation develops from the incentives of the market. Inno-
vation in this case is most often created by being the first company with a new 
technology and earning a monopolistic standing within the industry, e.g. 
through patent protection. Exogenous innovation describes a form of innovation 
which develops through a background outside the industry, e.g. academic re-
search (Sengupta, 2014, pp. 1–5).  
- Finally, there should be separation between incremental and radical/disruptive 
innovation. While the first means to make small changes piece by piece on an 
already existing product, the latter describes a complete substitution of an exist-
ing product (Stewart, 2011, p. 2). 
These “types” of innovation take place in an innovation process. One of the most com-
mon interpretations is from Andrew van de Ven (1999), who distinguishes between a 
linear and a cyclical model. The main difference between these models is that there are 
straightforward, defined tasks within the linear model and a more blurry, interdependent, 
and repeating process within the latter. Additionally, the cyclical model makes it diffi-
cult to comprehend which aspects are influencing which development. In comparison to 
the linear model, a cycle of the innovation process is defined by the obligatory fact that 
it must repeat itself (Figure 10.1). 
 
Regulatory Processes & Innovation Cycles in Times of Digitalization – a Contradiction? 
167 
Figure 1: Innovation cycle in the medical device industry  
 
Source: Own representation based on Van de Ven, 1999 and Mostardt, Ochs, et al., n.a. 
If we consider the previous information about the different subtypes and characteristics, 
innovation within the medical device industry by digital products can be categorized as 
follows: The first aspect of innovation arises through digitalization, which represents a 
divergent technology. Therefore, we see technology-based types of innovation. Second, 
mainly endogenous innovation can be observed. This is a result of the incentives of the 
healthcare market and its demand for innovative solutions. Third, digital products rep-
resent disruptive innovation. Those products do not only improve but also substitute 
existing products on the market. All this technology-based, endogenous, and disruptive 
innovation in the medical device industry happens within a cycle of innovation that cre-
ates incremental progress. This means that this new area in the medical device industry 
is improving through its changes. All these special factors lead to a special demand for 
regulation of the products created. 
This leads us to how innovation is adopted by the users: innovation - digitalization in 
particular - can hardly be described without diffusion. Diffusion is the process of com-
municating an innovation through a social system (Rogers, 2003, p. 10). Rogers distin-
guishes between different types of adopters, according to their innovativeness. This fac-
tor determines the rate of adoption of an innovation, i.e. how fast does an innovation 
establish itself within a system (Rogers, 2003, pp. 22–23). Additionally, innovation 
must be separated from invention: while innovation means a change in the producing 
systems of manufacturers, invention describes a shift within the technical opportunities 
themselves (Brozen, 1951, p. 239). Innovation itself always creates uncertainty, which 
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depends on the user’s possibility to evaluate the risks. Because the risks of medical prod-
ucts can hardly be assessed by the users - according to the principal-agent theory - it is 
the duty of regulatory procedures to reduce those risks for the patients. The specific 
aspects of health systems, e.g. the reimbursement system and the number of different 
actors, influence the diffusion of innovation. In consequence, the economic success of a 
medical app depends on the rate of diffusion, which in turn benefits from low uncertainty 
and short regulatory processes. Regulation therefore can have huge impact on diffusion 
of medical device innovation.  
2.3  The mutual impact of regulation and innovation 
The governmental approach of implementing regulatory processes in markets represents 
an interference with the liberal market environment. These actions are mandatory as a 
result of market failure provoked by asymmetric information as mentioned above (Aker-
lof, 1970; Samuelson, 1984). Consequently, those diverse conditions have several posi-
tive and negative effects on innovation cycles.  
On the one hand, different regulatory actions enhance the circumstances for innovation 
in markets. Regulation can ensure an appropriate level of competitiveness and openness 
among businesses. This is a main condition to promote innovation in an industry because 
a certain level of competitiveness sets incentives to achieve a competitive advantage 
(OECD, n.a., p. 12). Therefore, companies have to reach several requirements which 
can only be fulfilled by creating product or process innovations (Blind, 2016, p. 3). In 
contrast to this indirect way of promoting innovation, the straight approach would be 
realized by handing out intellectual property rights. This form of regulation is explicitly 
dedicated to enhancing innovation by giving patents to create a monopolistic situation 
as a reward (Blind, 2016, p. 3). 
On the other hand, regulation can lead to massive impediments for innovation. The reg-
ulatory burden on the companies requires financial resources and time which could oth-
erwise be invested in innovative approaches. This hits small companies trying to focus 
on their innovative initiatives especially hard (Stewart, 2011, p. 2). Regulation might 
also restrict research efforts, the possibility of using different technologies, and the tech-
nology diffusion (OECD, n.a., p. 12). Furthermore, competition can be hindered and 
market entry can be complicated. This leads to a delay in supply or even a cessation of 
production(Blind, 2016, pp. 8–10). Especially within the medical device industry, the 
interaction between regulation of and innovation in market entry plays a huge role: how 
is it possible to ensure patients have access to the newest innovations in a fast way but 
also make sure that safety is not jeopardized (WHO, 2010, p. 14)? 
The relationship between regulation and innovation seems to be one-sided because reg-
ulation has huge impact on innovation. Despite this, it can also be mutual and digitali-
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zation is a very suitable example. The development of digital products created new sec-
tions within many businesses, if not a business itself. Following Rogers (2003), innova-
tion leads to uncertainties about how to treat new products. Consequently, this innova-
tive development encourages the creation of new regulatory mechanisms (Bierbaum and 
Bierbaum, 2017, p. 249).  
3 Regulatory processes as a hurdle for innovation? Data from the U.S. and 
Germany 
3.1  The ‘mobile medical device’ – an example of innovation 
When renowned Harvard professor Clayton M. Christensen stated back in 2000 that 
healthcare could be “saved” by disruptive innovation, he would not have known that 
digitalization will maybe make this happen (Christensen et al., 2000). The introduction 
of digital opportunities created several new but blurry business fields in healthcare, e.g. 
mobileHealth (mHealth), telehealth and eHealth (Malvey and Slovensky, 2014). Ac-
cordingly, the range of digital medical devices is very inconsistent and does not improve 
with growing technical opportunities (Hudes, 2017, p. 1). For consistency in this work, 
a common understanding of what is meant with the term “medical device” in the digital 
spheres should be determined. First, the focus is exclusively on digital products. There 
is no doubt that innovation in the medical device industry happens in many ways, but 
digitalization has an outstanding position in the present time. Also, the innovation cycles 
of digital products differ heavily from physical products, creating several challenges for 
regulation.  
Second, a standard definition of “medical device” should be adopted by the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Mediz-
inprodukte (BfArM). These institutions are responsible for approval procedures for 
medical devices in the US and Germany. Accordingly, this essay will focus on the reg-
ulatory processes of mobile medical applications and will exclude health applications 
(programs with only preventive purpose), telemedicine, and any kind of health infor-
mation systems (BfArM, 2015; FDA, 2017b). The investigated programs are used by 
patients or professional users. mobile medical apps are software programs running on 
mobile devices, which fall into the category of medical devices in the US and Germany 
(BfArM, 2015; FDA, 2017c). This will be further be specified in the following sections. 
3.2 Regulatory processes and innovation cycles in the US 
The FDA first published a guideline for mobile medical applications in 2013 and up-
dated this due to dynamic development in 2015. This guideline states that a mobile med-
ical app must fall under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FD&C Act) (FDA, 2015, p. 7). This states the app has to be an accessory to a regulated 
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medical device or has to convert from a mobile platform into a regulated medical device 
(FDA, 2017c). The section 201(h) also gives a description of which criteria have to be 
met to be declared as medical device: a medical device has to affect body functions or 
be involved in “the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease”(FDA, 2015, p. 7). The application of this definition 
represents the first level of regulation. If the product does not meet this description, there 
will not be any regulatory process. As soon as the intended use of the digital product 
meets the definition, the same regulatory processes used for physical medical devices 
are applied (FDA, 2017c). The process starts with the classification of the mobile med-
ical device into three classes of risk. With a higher risk class, the severity of regulatory 
requirements increases. The medical device is allocated to one of the risk classes by a 
classification number, which belongs to the area of application on a human body (FDA, 
2014a). No matter which class a medical device is part of, there are general controls like 
being manufactured under a quality assurance program, fit for the intended use,  labeled 
adequately, and registered as well as listed by the FDA (FDA, 2014b). Class I is the 
most common for mobile apps and represents devices with low risk for the user which 
must only fulfill general controls in most cases. Medical devices with moderate risk 
ranked as Class II must pass a Premarket Notification 510(k) in addition (FDA, 2014a). 
This process should demonstrate to the FDA that the medical device is safe and effective 
by comparing it with an already established device on the market. After the 510(k) is 
found successful by the FDA, the product can be introduced immediately on the condi-
tion that there might be inspections at any time by the FDA (FDA, 2016). For high risk 
devices (Class III), a Premarket Approval is mandatory. This includes  scientific, regu-
latory documentation that demonstrates safety and effectiveness and is often supported 
by clinical studies (FDA, 2017d). After passing those regulatory processes the mobile 
medical device can be introduced to the US market (Kramer et al., 2012). 
The time-consuming parts within the regulatory process of the FDA are the Premarket 
Notification 510(k) and the Premarket Approval for risk classes II and III. For the 
510(k), the FDA sets itself a time frame of 90 days from the receipt of the 510(k) to 
come to a decision. If 100 days are exceeded, clarifying communication will take place 
(FDA, 2017e). In the case of the more strictly handled Premarket Approval for Class III 
devices, the time frame is extended to 180 days. The FDA confesses that the process 
may be lengthen if necessary (FDA, 2017d). In practice, the length of both regulatory 
processes take much longer: an investigation of all 510(k)-processes between 2012 and 
2016 shows an average of 177 days in 2016 instead of the proclaimed 90 days (Emergo 
Group, 2017, p. 5). Not even 20% of all devices are cleared within the proposed timeline 
(Emergo Group, 2017, p. 7). The same situation can be examined for the Premarket Ap-
proval process for class III medical devices. Data varies between 290 and up to 518 days 
Regulatory Processes & Innovation Cycles in Times of Digitalization – a Contradiction? 
171 
as average instead of 180 days (AOK-Bundesverband, 2013; Makower et al., 2010; Wal-
ter et al., 2016). Figure 10.2 summarizes the path of a digital product through the regu-
latory processes of the US. 
 
Figure 2: Regulatory process of a Mobile Medical Device in the US 
  
 
Meanwhile, innovation in the medical device industry is accelerating and the number of 
digital products is growing at an annual rate of 25 percent (Cortez et al., 2014, p. 372; 
FDA, 2017a). A survey under manufacturers carried out, that the most important drivers 
to gain competitive advantage are product innovation and reduction of time-to-market 
(PA Consulting, 2016, p. 12). Yet the time-to-market for medical devices takes three to 
seven years from conception to completing the regulatory processes (Fargen et al., 
2013). From the start of communication with the FDA to approval, it takes an average 
of one to two and a half years (Makower et al., 2010, p. 6; Rising and Moscovitch, 2015). 
This development provokes reaction from the regulatory institutions. To keep the num-
ber of mobile medical applications under control, the FDA sets very strict definitions of 
what is regulated and which products are not. Table 10.1 shows a selection of different 
regulations concerning mobile medical devices. Class III devices were not represented 
in the given examples of the FDA. A large portion of mobile apps which are per defini-
tion a medical device is excluded from regulatory processes because they pose low risk 
to consumer safety. For these low risk products there is no list with concrete details, 
only different examples (FDA, 2015, pp. 15–18). The broad exclusion of regulated mo-
bile medical apps suggests an overload of the regulatory capacity. Furthermore, the FDA 
presents a list of apps which may be a medical device (FDA, 2015, pp. 23–26). The FDA 
also does not make clear how to deal with updates. It is simply stated that “minor, iter-
ative product changes” do not require a re-evaluation of the product (FDA, 2017c). This 
underlines the uncertainty the institution when handling innovative products. 
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Table 1: Examples of FDA regulations for Mobile Medical Devices 
Device 
Name 
Applicant Clearance 
Date 
Regulation Descrip-
tion 
Risk 
Class 
JiveX 
VISUS TECHNOL-
OGY TRANSFER 
GMBH 
9/16/2016 
Picture archiving and com-
munications system 
Class II 
Lumify Ul-
trasound 
System 
Philips Healthcare 10/3/2016 
Ultrasonic pulsed doppler 
imaging system 
Class II 
(If a manufacturer's device falls into a generic 
category of exempted class I devices as de-
fined, there is no explicit regulation) 
 (e.g.) Calculator/data pro-
cessing module for clinical 
use 
Class I 
Source: FDA 2015. 
3.3 Regulatory processes and innovation cycles in Germany 
In Germany, most of the responsibility for defining products as medical devices and 
regulating market entry is transferred to the European Union. These European laws must 
be implemented into national law. Therefore, all European regulations are compulsory 
for the German system.  
As in the US, the first aspect for commercial distribution is the definition of the product. 
The German definition set in the Medizinproduktegesetz (MPG) follows the guideline 
93/42/EWG of the European Union (also called Medical Device Directive; MDD). The 
decisive factor for a mobile app being declared as medical device is – similar to the FDA 
– the intended use. If the device should be used for diagnosis, prevention, supervision, 
or cure of sickness or injury, to change a physiological process, or for contraception the 
MDD is applied. Comparable to the FDA, a risk classification for these medical devices 
is used. Applications are separated into Class I with low risk (with Is for sterile and Im 
for measuring), Classes IIa and IIb are for middle and increased risk products, respec-
tively, and Class III is for high risk devices. Figure 10.3 represents the process in Ger-
many. The classification is regulated under the MDD, which defines 18 rules regarding 
health risks (BfArM, 2015). According to these rules, most mobile medical devices are 
ranked Class I  and sometimes IIa or IIb (BfArM, 2015; Bierbaum and Bierbaum, 2017, 
p. 255). The MDD further classifies mobile medical devices as active medical devices 
which are dependent on an external power source and often ranked within higher risk 
classes (BfArM, 2015). If medical apps are changed or expanded by updates, there is no 
clear way to deal with the change. In cases of a tremendous impact on users health, the 
responsible authority has to be informed (Richtlinie 93/42/EWG des Rates. Europäisches 
Parlament und Rat, 1993).  
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Figure 3: Regulatory process of a Mobile Medical Device in Germany 
 
 
The aim of the regulatory process is the CE-sign, which shows the safety and effective-
ness and also allows medical devices to be distributed within the European Single Mar-
ket. Depending on the risk classification, the product must pass different assessments. 
Class I devices can be assessed by the manufacturer themselves and no inspection body 
is needed (e.g. TÜV; Technischer Überwachungsverein). For all other classes, an in-
spection body must be involved and a declaration of conformity must be provided 
(BfArM, 2015). The declaration of conformity depends on the risk classification and is 
determined by the regulations of the European Union. The requirements of approval 
procedures rise to correspond with higher risk classes. These can include risk manage-
ment, technical documentation up to clinical studies, and cost-benefit-analysis within 
the MDD (BMG, 2010). In contrast to the US, where the state-owned FDA does the 
assessment by 510(k) or Premarket Approval, the risk classification and the declaration 
of conformity is done by the manufacturer itself. Just the certification is performed by a 
chosen inspection body according to appendix I of the MDD (BMG, 2010). Germany is 
in a decentralized and less arranged setting compared to the more centralized and trans-
parent one in the US (Kramer et al., 2012, pp. 850–851). 
As in the US, the regulatory processes play the leading role on the way to the market. In 
contrast, the time-to-market is reduced due to decentralized regulation: empirical data 
shows that the CE-certificate is assigned 36 months earlier in Germany than in the US 
for devices with Premarket Approval (Hwang et al., 2016, p. 4).Yet, the whole process 
is still estimated to be between four to six years (Neumann et al., 2016, p. 50). In both 
countries, the approval for low- and moderate-risk devices seems quite similar, where 
most mobile medical apps are concerned (Kramer et al., 2012, p. 852). Nevertheless, 
with a maximum release cycle of less than one year (in comparison to more than three 
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years for normal medical devices), time-to-market increases and represents a loss of 
potential due to regulatory processes for innovative digital products (Knöpple et al., 
2016, p. 13). 
4 Possibilities for a harmonious interaction between regulation and inno-
vation in healthcare 
After looking at American and German medical device regulation, both have common-
alties and differences. The risk classification systems are obligatory and seem to be quite 
similar, while the degree of centralization as well was the length of regulatory processes 
differs (Kramer et al., 2012, p. 850) Theory also provides a necessary component of 
economic and social regulation to maintain fair market conditions and secure population 
health. Yet this has partly negative effects on innovation and diffusion of innovation due 
to long regulatory processes. Since innovation cycles are much shorter for mobile med-
ical apps, the application of the same regulatory processes as for physical devices seems 
questionable. Regarding the huge number of medical apps, a separate regulatory process 
would be more appropriate. For a better alignment, such a process is fictively proposed 
hereinafter: 
For manufacturers of mobile medical apps, it is important to get a fast and comprehen-
sive overview of the regulatory requirements. Therefore, a clear definition of a digital 
medical product must be found. The confusing mixture of terms like eHealth, mHealth, 
etc. prohibits a clear understanding and impedes the dialogue. The definition should be 
determined by concrete criteria and not the intended use or blurry examples. After an 
adequate definition and separation from apps with just preventive character, a classifi-
cation must take place. The used risk classifications seem to be proven, but the results 
are biased due to the mixture with normal medical devices. A system tailored for digital 
products is necessary because the risks of digital products can hardly be compared to 
risks of physical devices. Lewis & Wyatt (2014) e.g. separate between inherent (those 
within an app) and contextual risks (which occur through use). A three-stage classifica-
tion may maintain: Class I includes apps that contain or collect data. Within class II are 
apps that give support to the doctor or patient for diagnosis or therapy based on data. 
Class III would contain apps with data based recommendations for diagnosis or therapy 
that “substitute” care providers  (Knöpple et al., 2016, pp. 22–25; Neumann et al., 2016, 
p. 25). This classification may be executed by a decision tree or similar tool. Of decisive 
importance is the consideration of updates. The development of digital products often 
happens through an iterative process and in cooperation with the final user. Furthermore, 
algorithms may be used, which evolve with increasing application (Neumann et al., 
2016, pp. 32–35). This must be considered within the regulatory process and demands 
a reporting system. This hypothetical regulatory process is depicted in figure 10.4. 
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No approval procedure should be prescribed for class I devices because these would not 
intervene in treatment. For classes II and III, a procedure similar to that used for drugs 
can be conceivable: due to the iterative development process of apps, it may be tested 
step-by-step by raising sample sizes until a market maturity can be attested to (Neumann 
et al., 2016, pp. 32–35). This process may also lead to an upgrade in risk classes for 
medical apps. Accordingly, updates must be reported to the competent authority within 
a post-market surveillance system. If this authority should be centralized or decentral-
ized is hard to answer. Since a decentralized system can accomplish regulatory processes 
obviously faster, it seems to be more suitable for medical apps to enable an appropriate 
chance for diffusion (for further inspiration how regulatory processes might be adopted 
to medical apps see Boulos et al., 2014; Lewis and Wyatt, 2014; Neumann et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 4: Hypothetical regulatory process for Mobile Medical Devices 
 
 
It remains unclear how such a risk classification system is appropriate for learning algo-
rithms and how to evaluate the storing of personal data. As such, this example of an 
autonomous regulation for medical apps might go too far for now, but it may give ideas 
for future improvements to regulatory processes.  
5 Conclusion  
Innovation in healthcare calls for changes in the rigid systems of the US, Germany, and 
many other countries. The barriers to creating medical devices decline due to the oppor-
tunities presented by digitalization. Strongly altered structures are the consequence and 
governments must adapt their regulatory processes. Internationally changes are occur-
ring: The European Parliament approved a new Medical Device Regulation in April 
2017 with a transitional period of three years. Therein, medical apps earn greater im-
portance, but the regulatory processes will not be simplified, quite the contrary. The old 
classification system remains but new wording ranks software risks often higher than 
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before, which leads to longer regulatory processes. This means much more burden on 
most, often young, innovative companies, which might fail due to this regulation. In-
stead, a regulatory system that encourages innovative products by enabling an adequate 
speed of the process would be a better way to promote and enable innovation in the 
medical device industry.  
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